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A. Dispute Processing-The Paradigm Extended
DISPUTE PROCESSING AND A
LONGITUDINAL APPROACH TO TRIAL
COURTS
LYNN MATHER
This article suggests ways to integrate the insights and findings
of two rather distinct fields: docket-based, longitudinal studies of
trial courts and studies of dispute processing. In particular, I argue
that longitudinal research on courts would benefit enormously from
the incorporation of concepts and data on dispute processing. For ex-
ample, instead of taking court cases as the starting point for study,
longitudinal research should explore the multistage and transforma-
tive nature of disputing. Historical data should also be collected on
the nature of the relationships between opposing litigants, on the
roles played by participants other than the litigants (lawyers, sup-
porters, audiences, third parties), and on the nature of processes
within courts and within alternative community institutions for han-
dling disputes. Longitudinal research can also contribute to our un-
derstanding of dispute processing by showing how current processes
have been shaped by past use, and how changes in institutions and
legal doctrine have influenced the definition and processing of dis-
putes. I also discuss the weaknesses shared by some of the research
in both fields, such as a greater concern for process than for outcome,
a tendency to ignore political aspects of litigation, and an overempha-
sis on individual disputing behavior. I conclude by suggesting that
longitudinal research on trial courts should pay greater attention to
change in ideas about law and to shifting conceptions of right and
wrong, cause and responsibility, and problem definition.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE DISPUTE: Paul and his wife Suzanne have quarreled
for years, usually resolving their differences with physical
violence. One morning Suzanne burned the toast, and
Paul got angry and hit her with the hot frying pan.
DISPUTE PROCESSING IN 1955? Suzanne told everyone her
injury was an accident and vowed never again to burn the
toast. She did not perceive a "dispute"; after all, Jackie
Gleason regularly threatened Alice on TV for her "dumb"
actions, and such fighting was quite normal for families.
DISPUTE PROCESSING IN 1970? Suzanne was angry at
Paul and called the police to file a criminal complaint
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against him. The police attempted informally to mediate
the argument but without success. Suzanne was told that
legal action was inappropriate here since it was just a fam-
ily fight and not a criminal matter.
DISPUTE PROCESSING IN 1985? Suzanne called the police
to file a criminal complaint against Paul. The police for-
warded her complaint to the local prosecutor, and Paul
was prosecuted for assault in criminal court. Suzanne also
received support from the local women's shelter about how
to obtain a temporary restraining order from the civil
court. Paul's criminal case was settled by plea negotiation,
with a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence of probation
and counseling.
Research on dispute processing can help us understand why
this hypothetical dispute was handled as it was in each year. Such
research raises questions about the issues involved in the dispute
and the cultural views of those issues, the relationship between the
parties and the differences of power and resources between them,
the nature and accessibility of alternative legal and nonlegal
processes for dispute resolution, the roles played by supporters and
third-party interveners, and the operational, local meaning of the
formal law on assault. With this information we can develop a
rich portrayal of disputant choices--fighting, "lumping it," media-
tion, negotiation, and the threat of adjudication-situated in time
and place. But what is missing is an understanding of the dynamic
that changes dispute processing over time and that explains how
and why the alternatives for Suzanne were different in 1985 than
they were in earlier years.
One way to fill that gap is through longitudinal research on
the use of trial courts that is sensitive to the broader social and
political context of courts. Such a study would show an increase in
criminal and civil court filings involving complaints by wives
against husbands for violence. Further research could link the
court data to broad socioeconomic and political changes (e.g., more
working women and greater political power for women) or to spe-
cific policy changes (e.g., new laws specifically prohibiting spouse
abuse, successful class action lawsuits against police by battered
wives, and policy announcements from prosecutors' offices regard-
ing domestic violence).
Longitudinal analysis of the use of courts by battered wives
could be further improved, however, by attention to some of the
factors important for research on dispute processing. For example,
one could examine changes in the support networks for the parties
(e.g., women's shelters and hotlines), changes in the popular cul-
ture (e.g., mass media portrayals of husband/wife fighting and
documentaries on spouse abuse), changes in language (e.g., from
"family fights" to "battered wives" and "domestic violence"), and
changes in the demographics and training of legal personnel (e.g.,
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more women police officers and prosecutors, and new police train-
ing programs).
While the fields of dispute processing and longitudinal studies
of trial courts have each grown enormously in recent years, it is
striking that there has been so little linkage or integration of the
two. In this comment I would like to suggest possible avenues of
convergence. I will first summarize major contributions of the dis-
pute processing literature and then discuss ways in which the two
literatures might complement each other, and specifically how lon-
gitudinal research might help to answer some of the critiques of
dispute processing and how insights from the disputes field could
inform longitudinal research on courts.
II. LESSONS FROM DISPUTE-PROCESSING RESEARCH
Anthropologists were among the first to use disputes and
processes of dispute settlement as a framework for research on
law.1 The challenge of developing theory about law based on com-
parative data demanded a focus that would cross-cut societies and
their individual moots, courts, and other institutions (Nader and
Todd, 1978). The result was an emphasis on processes of dispute
settlement with an interest in the determinants and consequences
of different modes of dispute settlement and attention to the "full
socio-cultural context of the dispute cases" (Gulliver, 1969a: 13).
Continuing in this research tradition, Abel (1973) developed a the-
ory of dispute processes based upon role differentiation of the
third-party intervener both with respect to the dispute institution
and to the larger society. Recent research on dispute processing
has developed several major themes: the role of courts in handling
disputes, the importance of relations between the parties for dis-
pute processing, the transformation of disputes, and the alternative
strategies and processes for dispute resolution. The incorporation
of this work in the longitudinal analysis of trial court usage is
badly needed.
First, longitudinal studies should recognize the multivariate
and multistage nature of disputing instead of taking court cases as
the starting point for study. Perhaps the most common image of
dispute processing, presented by the Civil Litigation Research
Project (Miller and Sarat, 1980-81), is of a disputing pyramid in
which there is a wide base of grievances at the bottom. Grievances
may move up the pyramid as they are voiced as claims, and, if re-
jected by the opposing party, they become disputes. At the very
top-the tip of the proverbial disputing iceberg--are those disputes
filed as legal cases in court. Clearly, courts are used to resolve
only a very few of the disputes in society, and a central task is to
understand how courts become involved in some conflicts but not
1 See, e.g., Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941), Nader (1969a), Gulliver (1963),
and Nader and Todd (1978).
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others, which involves looking at individual features of conflicts as
well as characteristics of the court, its alternatives, and the society
(Sarat and Grossman, 1975). In taking this disputes-focused ap-
proach, one places courts in their wider context, and the dispute
becomes "a conceptual link between law and society" (Trubek,
1980-81a: 494).
A problem for this approach in terms of understanding the
role of courts in society is that the central concept--dispute-is not
a single event easily identified but rather a stage in a social rela-
tionship (Abel, 1973). Further, while scholars stress the impor-
tance of knowing what occurs prior to the dispute, they disagree in
their definitions of the predispute stages and of the dispute itself.2
The earliest stages of the disputing process have received particu-
lar attention from scholars interested in how and where claims are
generated. Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat (1980-81: 634-35) identify
the stages of the disputing process as naming, or experiencing an
injury or problem; blaming, or attributing the injury to the fault of
another party; and claiming, or confronting the opposing party
and asking for some remedy.3
A cntral question for investigators of the disputing process
is: What moves a grievance from one stage to another? Put an-
other way, What explains variations among disputes? Why do
some emerge at the top of the pyramid in court while others do
not? In the economic model of Cooter and Rubinfeld (1990), the
rational self-interest of the disputing parties is the driving force;
they each try to maximize their own gain through bargaining, and
it is only when the bargaining fails that the dispute moves on to
the next stage. Other research points to different factors at work:
the type of grievance (Miller and Sarat, 1980-81); the goals, re-
sources, and capabilities of the parties (Galanter, 1974a); the in-
volvement of supporters or an audience (Mather and Yngvesson,
1980-81); cultural attitudes toward law and conflict (Engel, 1984;
Merry and Silbey, 1984); the role of lawyers (Rosenthal, 1974;
Johnson, 1980-81); characteristics of the third party (Abel, 1973) or
the disputing forum (Yngvesson and Mather, 1983); the availability
of alternative processes (Silberman, 1985); and the relationship be-
tween the parties (Macaulay, 1963; Collier, 1973).4
Second, longitudinal studies should explore the nature of the
2 Compare, for example, the definitions of Nader and Todd (1978: 14-15),
Gulliver (1979: 75), Abel (1973: 227), and Miller and Sarat (1980-81: 527-29).
3 Other categorizations of stages in the disputing process are provided by
Silberman (1985) and Boyum (1983), but compare Cooter and Rubinfeld (1990).
I have some trouble with the distinction between "naming" and "blaming,"
since definitions of problems, as social and linguistic constructs, tend to join
facts and norms (Mather and Yngvesson, 1980-81; Comaroff and Roberts,
1977). Thus the very act of naming incorporates the blaming. Or, as Silber-
man (1985: 4) writes, "there is no reason to believe that the cognitive and eval-
uative aspects of such events are separable."
4 For further discussion of these and other factors, see Sarat and Gross-
man (1975) and Nader and Todd (1978). Silberman (1985) shows how certain
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relationship between opposing parties in court. Scholars have long
argued that individuals or organizations with close, continuing re-
lations are less likely than strangers to use legal norms and proce-
dures to settle their disputes. Out of a concern to preserve their
relationship, parties with such ongoing ties-whether social, inter-
personal, or economic-prefer to handle their grievances in nonle-
gal or unofficial ways.5 A macro version of this view of continuing
relations and the law underlies much of the research on litigation
and social change. That is, since related parties are unlikely to use
law for dispute settlement, then as close personal and social rela-
tionships break down, one expects an increase in the use of litiga-
tion to resolve disputes, a proposition that has been explored both
through comparative and longitudinal research.
6
Although the continuing relations argument sensitizes us to
the importance of relations between parties for their disputing be-
havior, it does not mean that we should ignore the use of law by
those who are closely related. Yngvesson (1985a) summarizes em-
pirical work, which is often overlooked, on the use of legal and
other official processes by those with ongoing social ties, showing
the significance of such use for defining and changing the very ba-
sis of relationships. "Law and courts shape ongoing relations,"
writes Yngvesson (ibid., p. 62), especially when relationships are
viewed over the long term and when attention is paid to strategic
and political aspects of the disputing process. In a retrospective,
Macaulay (1985) reiterated his basic argument on the marginality
of contract law for long-term, continuing business relations but
also added several interesting examples of cases in which litigation
did provide a basis for the renegotiation of the terms of the rela-
tionship (see Blegvad, 1990).
A third contribution of research on dispute processing to lon-
gitudinal, docket-based analysis begins with the observation that a
case as it appears in court may not reflect the underlying dispute
factors may have a greater effect at one stage of the disputing process than at
others.
5 The continuing relations argument is found in some of the earliest and
most significant works in the law and society field. Macaulay (1963) showed
that people in business avoid contract law in planning exchanges and seldom
use legal sanctions to settle disputes, believing that such intervention would
disrupt the ongoing business relationships. Nader (1965), Gulliver (1963), Col-
lier (1973), and other legal anthropologists found that among kin groups or
within small, face-to-face societies people prefer to resolve disputes through
informal, compromise-oriented procedures to preserve harmony within the
group. Gluckman (1955) made this point in terms of multiplex as versus sin-
gle-interest relationships, arguing that disputants with multiplex relations use
processes that emphasize conciliation and that are directed toward the mainte-
nance of continuing relations. Sociologist Black (1970) pointed to the impor-
tance of relational distance on the mobilization of law based upon his finding
that offenses were less likely to be labeled crimes if they occurred between
closely related people such as family or friends; he later expanded this argu-
ment in his 1976 book.
6 See Sarat and Grossman (1975), McIntosh (1983), and Munger (1988).
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or even the initial conflict. A dispute is not a singular, identifiable
entity that moves without change from one stage to another in the
process of attempted resolution. Instead, disputes change---or are
transformed--as different participants assert their own interests
and perspectives on the conflict. Thus "what a dispute is about,
whether it is even a dispute, and whether it is properly a 'legal'
dispute, may be central issues for negotiation in the disputing pro-
cess" (Mather and Yngvesson, 1980-81: 776-77; see Santos, 1977).
Longitudinal research must take this transformation into account
when considering the type of dispute as recorded in court dockets.
A transformation of a dispute is a change in its form or con-
tent. It includes changes in the identity or number of parties, the
scope and number of issues, and the objectives of the participants
involved in a dispute (Felstiner et al., 1980-81), or change in the
conceptual framework for viewing the dispute (Mather and Yng-
vesson, 1980-81). A focus on the normative framework and defini-
tions of a dispute reveals the political aspects of disputing and is
especially useful for linking "routine processes of conflict manage-
ment and broader considerations of legal order and change"
(Yngvesson and Mather, 1983: 64). When a dispute is "ex-
panded"-rephrased in terms of a new normative framework-it
raises a challenge to the established normative order. The chal-
lenge may easily be contained by "narrowing" the dispute into a
previously established category, or expansion may lead directly or
indirectly to legal change (Mather and Yngvesson, 1980-81).
Change may result from the appellate judicial process, the mobili-
zation of public opinion, the formation of an interest group, the at-
tention of legislative or other political officials, or even through an
increase in further litigation. Longitudinal studies should explore
all of these political processes as possible explanations of changes
in a particular type of trial court litigation.
A fourth contribution of dispute processing research is its rec-
ognition of the importance of participants other than the liti-
gants-representatives or supporters of the litigants, a broader
public or audience, or a third party such as mediator, arbitrator, or
judge-in shaping the process of dispute transformation (Mather
and Yngvesson, 1980-81; Felstiner et al., 1980-81; Fitzgerald and
Dickins, 1980-81; Yngvesson and Mather, 1983). Lawyers as repre-
sentatives of the disputants, as specialists in the language of the
law, and as actors with their own interests are clearly important
agents of dispute transformation. Interest groups often sponsor
test cases, thus transforming the grievances of individual litigants
into a conflict that furthers the larger political interest of the
group. An audience plays a special role in dispute processing by
reinforcing particular views of a case and setting up expectations
for the outcome. 7
7 Audience expectations may significantly constrain or influence the ac-
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Trial court judges transform disputes when they redefine is-
sues under consideration, create new alternatives for action, or add
or subtract parties to the case. Not only the judge but also the en-
tire institution of the court can change a dispute to fit its own or-
ganizational, bureaucratic, or political needs; Seron (1990) argues
that just as the individual motivations of litigants affect the input
and outcomes of courts, so do court organizational practices influ-
ence how cases are resolved. Consideration of the transformation
of disputes thus highlights the significant roles of participants
other than the disputants. It also shows the need to distinguish
carefully and identify the object of the dispute and the structure of
the conflict as it exists at each stage of the process, rather than as-
suming that these do not change.8
Finally, courts may embody several processes of conflict reso-
lution and be situated among institutions providing still other
processes. Scholars have explored the empirical differences in
processes such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or adjudica-
tion; the determinants of the choice of process; and the relation be-
tween processes of conflict resolution and the social order (Fuller,
1978; Strauss, 1978; Gulliver, 1979). Longitudinal research often
builds implicitly on a social development model in which dispute
processes become more formal and coercive as societies increase in
complexity (for summary of the model, see Friedman, 1983). In-
vestigators should explore, however, the full range of processes ac-
tually used by disputants at each point. A community's ideology of
conflict management may in fact be quite different from the di-
verse strategies- and processes of conflict management actually em-
ployed (Yngvesson and Mather, 1983).
Comparison between alternative forums within a society has
led to suggestions about the consequences of process for dispute
outcomes. McEwen and Maiman (1984), for example, found that
defendants in small claims disputes were much more likely to
comply with mediated agreements than with adjudicated judg-
ments (but cf. Vidmar, 1984; McEwen and Maiman, 1986). Inter-
tions of those involved in the dispute, a point perhaps illustrated by Burstein's
(1987) research. His comparison of equal opportunity litigation by four minor-
ity groups shows greater federal resources for support and a more favorable
win-loss ratio in complaints of racial or sexual discrimination than in com-
plaints of discrimination based on religion or national origin. Although the
law is the same for all four groups, I would argue that the audience is not; that
is, both a broad public and a relevant public have been far stronger and more
attentive to racial and sexual discrimination than to discrimination on other
grounds.
8 To use the language of strategy, the litigation process should not be
seen as one continuous bargaining game (as suggested by Cooter and
Rubinfeld, 1990) but rather as a sequential series of bargaining games under
different institutional structures and with different sets of participants and
preferred solutions. Depending upon the interaction and roles played by liti-
gants, lawyers, other supporters, the audience, and the judge, the feasibility of
arriving at different alternatives may change, thus presenting a series of
games.
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estingly, comparison between forums often reveals the diversity of
actions included within a single label such as "mediation" or "adju-
dication." That mediator strategies may vary greatly has been
noted by Gulliver (1979), Silbey and Merry (1986), and McEwen
and Maiman (1986). Indeed, "in particular types of cases some
mediators may judge and some judges may mediate" (McEwen and
Maiman, 1986: 443). Moreover, the element of coercion that is so
integral to adjudication is also found in mediation (Shapiro, 1981;
Merry, 1982). In view of the tremendous variation found within
each of these processes and the inevitable mixture of elements of
mediation and adjudication, some question the usefulness of sharp
distinctions between mediation and adjudication (Shapiro, 1981;
Yngvesson and Mather, 1983).
Longitudinal work is beginning to pay more attention to the
nature of processes found within trial courts. In research that is
reported in this issue, Padgett (1990) analyzes changes over time in
the different forms of plea bargaining in criminal court; Seron
(1990) discusses a shift in the federal courts from adjudication to
more routine administration, but also notes that the analytic dis-
tinction between the two may be blurred in actual practice; and
Ietswaart (1990) summarizes the conceptual problem faced by the
European Working Group in identifying what counts as "litiga-
tion" for purposes of comparative research. She proposes that the
term "litigation" be reserved for disputing before public third par-
ties (i.e., adversary disputes in court), while the term "court
caseload" would include the totality of what courts do-that is, ad-
ministrative case processing as well as litigation. In their empirical
work in both fields-longitudinal research and dispute process-
ing-scholars have been somewhat frustrated by an inability to de-
lineate clearly alternative modes of handling disputes.
III. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF LONGITUDINAL
RESEARCH ON TRIAL COURTS TO DISPUTE
PROCESSING RESEARCH
Dispute processing research has shown the importance of the
social context of disputes, the stages and factors involved in the
emergence and attempted resolution of disputes, the consequences
of redefining disputes, and the range of alternative processes and
institutions for handling disputes. However, the field has not been
without its weaknesses, 9 some of which could be addressed
through longitudinal research. For example, dispute processing re-
search often takes a static and ahistorical approach, portraying a
rich picture of disputant choices among alternative modes of dis-
9 For critical discussions of dispute processing see Fitzgerald and Dickins
(1980-81), Lempert (1980-81), Kidder (1980-81), Cain and Kulcsar (1981-82),
Merry and Silbey (1984), and Menkel-Meadow (1985).
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pute settlement fixed at one point in time.10 But while we under-
stand the basis for these choices, we know little of the origins of
alternative modes of settlement and how current perceptions of
them have been shaped by past use. "What we do need to know is
how the mechanisms for dispute processing, both formal and infor-
mal, got created, modified, and incorporated into the strategies of
competing interests ... [and how] existing institutional forms ...
reflect previous battles" (Kidder, 1980-81: 724). Answering this
need is precisely where longitudinal research can be useful. Stud-
ies could explore the sociopolitical development of various institu-
tions for handling conflict, and how and why the use of these insti-
tutions has changed over time. Longitudinal data could also chart
the generation and emergence of new grievances and disputes that
have entered the legal system (Miller and Sarat, 1980-81: 565).
The longitudinal view may also help to identify the role of ac-
tors-such as the state, trial courts themselves, or other institu-
tions-that case studies and ahistorical research tend to overlook.
Work on dispute processing has been criticized for its inattention
to the institutions that process disputes and to the laws that influ-
ence settlement. Lempert (1980-81: 708) suggests, for example,
that understanding dispute-settlement institutions should be "a
starting rather than an ending point" for research, and Fitzgerald
and Dickins (1980-81: 702) ask in their critique, "Is the context
overwhelming the law?" In a sense, the inattention to law and in-
stitutions can be simply explained as overreaction: In taking a
broader look at disputes, scholars were reacting against a body of
work that centered narrowly on courts and legal doctrine, so it is
not surprising that those central features of an earlier paradigm
became more peripheral concerns in dispute processing research.
As the field has matured, there has been greater recognition of the
importance of these once central concerns. For instance, in re-
sponding to criticism of the disputes-focused approach, Trubek
(1980-81b: 744) acknowledged the need for research on "how
courts, dispute processing options, and legal doctrine itself affect
both the emergence and the suppression of disputes." Longitudi-
nal research can be very useful on this point by exploring the im-
pact of changes in institutions and legal doctrine on the definition,
processing, and outcomes of disputes.
IV. SHARED PROBLEMS
Many studies with a disputes-focused approach share certain
weaknesses with longitudinal research, including an overemphasis
on process to the exclusion of outcomes, a failure to examine the
10 Some dispute processing research has specifically attempted to incorpo-
rate a dynamic view of conflict management in society. Emphasis on transfor-
mation in the normative framework used to define a dispute provides a
linkage between the micro picture of individual disputing and the macro view
of law, social order, and social change (Mather and Yngvesson, 1980-81).
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political significance of dispute processing due to the lack of an un-
derlying theory of social conflict, and a narrow focus on choices of
individual litigants.
First, dispute processing studies have been overly concerned
with the process of handling disputes and have paid too little atten-
tion to dispute outcomes. When Menkel-Meadow (1985: 39) makes
this point, she calls especially for more discussion of the quality or
utility of outcomes, while Lempert (1980-81: 707) simply notes the
confounding of outcomes and output and the inaccuracy of using
court decisions as measures of party outcome (since, for example,
the losing party does not always comply with the decision). Later
in the same article, Lempert (ibid., pp. 711-14) argues for research
on the relation between the perceived legitimacy of law and nor-
mal processes of dispute settlement. In their critique, Fitzgerald
and Dickins (1980-81: 689-91) also suggest that research on disput-
ing should include a number of important features of dispute out-
comes, such as changes in the parties' prestige, status, and power;
the impact of the dispute on the relationship between the parties;
and changes in outlook of the disputants.
Longitudinal studies of court usage have also shown more con-
cern for process than for outcome. Scholars have measured litiga-
tion rates to assess change in the use of courts for handling dis-
putes, comparing rates over time, across regions, and for different
types of disputes. Less often do we find historical work on the out-
comes of cases and a recognition of the feedback loops whereby
the outcomes of cases shape future litigation. The economists have
pursued a version of this point, however; Cooter and Rubinfeld
(1990) summarize the argument that law is "market-driven,"
meaning that "inefficient" laws (and presumably judicial deci-
sions) are more likely than efficient ones to lead to an increase in
litigation. Other than in economics and in political science studies
of the impact of Supreme Court cases, most sociolegal studies have
not addressed the question of the impact of case outcomes in trial
courts.
Galanter (1983b: 118) has suggested that instead of looking at
"the centripetal movement of cases into courts," we should assess
the "centrifugal flow of influence" outward from courts and the
impact of legal messages on society. This view, as Engel (1985:
103-4) comments, returns law and society research full circle back
to a concern for legal doctrine, but now with greater attention to
linkages between judicial decisions and processes of conflict resolu-
tion. "Doctrine" does not just refer to the narrow rulings of appel-
late courts, however, but should be taken much more broadly to
include all "legal messages": court rulings (appellate and trial),
patterns of negotiated dispositions, meanings attached to different
kinds of cases (including those that are both accepted and rejected
by the courts), and the ideas about law and social problems that
are communicated by legal personnel.
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A second problem with much of the disputing literature is
that, as Kidder (1980-81: 719) writes, "the notion of dispute settle-
ment has . . . been decidedly apolitical." There is a functionalist
assumption in this body of work that disputes upset the social or-
der and that mechanisms such as courts should resolve disputes
and restore order (Cain and Kulcsar, 1981-82). Viewing dispute
behavior solely as disruptive stands in contrast to a concept of liti-
gation as a form of political participation (Zemans, 1983) or to a
view of dispute strategy as a political vehicle for changing or main-
taining the normative order (Moore, 1972; Kidder, 1980-81; Mather
and Yngvesson, 1980-81). All too often, disputing research ignores
the macro social and economic forces that structure processes of
disputing and thus fails to address the relation between disputes
and conflict (Menkel-Meadow, 1985). When disputes are seen as
quarrels and grievances, there is a tendency somehow to forget
their link to law and the norms of the state. Arguments may be
over resources or over values--who's right and who's wrong-but
whenever they involve public third parties, they are likely to in-
volve collective values, political processes, and the possibility of
some form of coercion.
Studies that compare litigation rates over time with various
socioeconomic trends also often ignore the political aspects of liti-
gation. That is, courts are viewed simply as passive receptacles for
conflicts that bubble up from society in times of social or economic
stress. This view is empirically inaccurate and theoretically mis-
leading. Courts are active vehicles of law and the state, and they
can (and do) do a great deal to shape the nature and amount of
litigation. Further, in his critique of the functionalist view of liti-
gation, Munger (1988) shows how the use of courts is a function of
strategy and of litigation capacity. Longitudinal studies of trial
courts need to understand the political uses of courts and to situate
courts within a changing political context. In an essay in this vol-
ume, Seron (1990) develops this same point, observing the irony of
historical research' on litigation trends that ignores the history of
political modification of court processes. More recent longitudinal
studies have in fact begun to incorporate political factors in their
analysis. McIntosh (1983), for example, in his analysis of litigation
rates, includes measures of court capacity and political context.
Also in this volume, Heydebrand (1990) shows how policies and ac-
tions of the federal government significantly determine patterns of
litigation in the federal courts, and Monkkonen (1990) argues for a
view of local criminal courts as part of the applied level of the
state. Padgett's (1990) study of plea bargaining in the federal
courts investigates both the process and outcome of liquor law vio-
lations over time, and builds into the analysis changes in the
number of judges, differences in judicial backgrounds, and public
opinion toward Prohibition.
Finally, both bodies of research-dispute processing and longi-
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tudinal approaches to litigation-suffer from an overemphasis on
individual disputing behavior. Individuals are seen as the key
players, acting on their grievances and strategically seeking third
parties to aid in resolving conflict. In Kidder's (1980-81) critique
of disputing research, he relates the individualistic bias of a dis-
putes-focused approach to Western legal assumptions about the
primacy of individuals and their legal rights and to the influence
of these assumptions on the work of legal anthropologists. Seron
(1990) extends the same critique to longitudinal studies of patterns
of litigation, remarking on the individualistic, reductionist bias in
which questions of social and legal conflict are simply reduced to
one of individual motivation and to individual litigious behavior.
When assuming this individualistic focus, sociolegal research has
often ignored the constraining web of interactions and linkages be-
tween disputants and others-whether family, neighbors, lawyers,
other supporters, or those watching the conflict. Even in modern
Western litigation, it makes little sense to develop an approach
based on individual actors when so much litigation involves organi-
zations, thus requiring negotiation of conflict within the organiza-
tion about how to deal with the opposing party. Kidder (1980-81:
725) emphasizes the group context of disputes and points out that
individuals may "become involved in disputing as agents of collec-
tivities" and that individual actions may be "shaped primarily by
the internal dynamics of groups to which they belong."
Merry and Silbey (1984) find yet another problem with the in-
dividualistic slant of disputing analysis: When disputing is seen as
rational choice making and as essentially instrumental behavior,
then one underestimates considerations of cultural norms and val-
ues; instead, disputes should be seen as "cultural events," with the
recognition that ways of dealing with them "derive from habits
and customs embedded in social groups and cultures" (ibid., p.
157). They argue that studies of dispute processing must be broad-
ened beyond rational considerations of strategy to include norma-
tive elements of culture-beliefs, symbols, and values-as essential
components of dispute behavior. Engel (1984) makes this point
convincingly in his empirical study of ideology and litigation in
Sander County, and it is interesting that the critique is proving
useful in some longitudinal research on litigation. Bergstrom
(1988) attempted to explain the rise of personal injury litigation at
the turn of the century in New York City by industrialization, a
rapid increase in injuries, a greater need for help by injury victims,
or change in the legal process (changes in either tort doctrine or
accessibility of courts). Finding none of these explanations satis-
factory, Bergstrom turned to changes in popular consciousness
about cause and responsibility. He concludes that conceptual
change-"a change in ideas"-is the most promising explanation
for the rise of litigation at that time. This conclusion is an impor-
tant one, inviting a shift in research toward ideology and culture.
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V. CONCLUSION
Future research on trial courts and social change should, I
think, pursue two major avenues of inquiry. On the one hand,
there should be greater attention to ideas about law and shifting
conceptions of right and wrong, cause and responsibility, and prob-
lem definition. On the other hand, when examining the changing
use of courts, there should also be greater attention to the context
of disputing and to the nature of alternative institutions and
processes for handling disputes.
A number of scholars have identified a focus on ideology as a
promising approach to understanding law and social processes.
Special issues of the Legal Studies Forum (1985) and the Law &
Society Review (1988) explore, for example, how judicial impact
can be understood in terms of the changing legal consciousness of
a community (Brigham, 1985); a view of law as social practice
(Silbey, 1985), with legal and social practice inseparable and recip-
rocally constitutive (Sarat, 1985); the conceptualization of sociole-
gal relations in the ideology of mediation (Harrington, 1985); and
the nature and operation of legal ideology in different neighbor-
hoods and courts (Merry, 1985; Yngvesson, 1985b). Longitudinal
research could draw on this approach to investigate how law em-
bodied a particular set of ideas and beliefs at different points in
time.
By identifying a change in ideas as critical to an observed in-
crease in personal injury litigation, Bergstrom (1988) invited in-
quiry into the nature and development of legal ideology. Using his
study as an illustration, I suggest that further research focus on
the cultural and political context of this change. What was the
context, particularly the political setting, for this shift in thinking
about personal injury? What were the sources of empowerment
that facilitated jurors' opposition to judicial decisions? How were
other institutions, such as schools, industries, and churches, chang-
ing or maintaining their social practices? Who were the popular
heroes, and how did the media portray conflicts and law? What
language was used to describe accidental injuries, and how did the
legal language correspond to more general discourse? Attention to
the shifting symbols, beliefs, and meaning attached to personal in-
jury law could improve our understanding of injury victims' in-
creased use of courts.
A second path for improving longitudinal research on trial
courts is to apply some of the insights of dispute processing to gain
a better understanding of how and why disputes end up in courts.
This approach involves gathering a wider range of data than is typ-
ically found in longitudinal studies. First, one would examine the
various modes of dispute settlement seen as alternatives to trial
courts as well as the nature of the trial court itself at different
times. What were the processes within different institutions?
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Who were their staffs, and how were they related to different fac-
tions or groups within the community? What was the nature of
connections between courts and other centers of political power?
Second, instead of organizing disputes by their subject matter in
conventional legal categories, consider organizing them by nature
of the disputing parties. That is, who were the parties? What was
their relation to the legal system (e.g., in terms of political connec-
tions, previous litigation experience, and resources)? Did individu-
als from certain families or areas of town regularly use of courts?
What was the nature of the relationship between disputing par-
ties? Third, explore the meaning and context of the case itself,
rather than taking it as a given. What social, cultural, and political
understandings were reflected in particular case labels? What al-
ternative conceptualizations were available to characterize specific
incidents or problems, and what influenced the choice of alterna-
tives? Fourth, enlarge the focus of research beyond the litigants
and the judge to include others involved in the disputing process.
Were lawyers involved? If so, what was their social and political
identity, and what was their fee structure? How were groups-
family, ethnic, class, political, or organization-involved in individ-
ual disputes? What was the nature of any publicity about cases?
Gathering these kinds of data is admittedly difficult and thus a
formidable challenge for historical research. Despite the difficul-
ties, however, this approach promises a view of litigation that is
richer and more complete than much of the current literature. In
conjunction with study of law and ideology, longitudinal studies of
dispute processing and courts can greatly contribute to a better un-
derstanding of law and social change.
